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Is Labor Green?
A Cross-National Panel Analysis of 
Unionization and Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Camila Huerta Alvarez, Julius Alexander McGee, and Richard York
i
Abstract: In this article, we assess whether unionization of national work-
forces influences growth in national carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per 
capita. Political-economic theories in environmental sociology propose that 
labor unions have the potential to affect environmental conditions. Yet, few 
studies have quantitatively assessed the influence of unionization on environ-
mental outcomes using cross-national data. We estimate multilevel regression 
models using data on OECD member nations from 1970 to 2014. Results from 
our analysis indicate that unionization, measured as the percentage of work-
ers who are union members, is negatively associated with CO2 emissions per 
capita, even when controlling for labor conditions. This finding suggests that 
unionization may promote environmental protection at the national level.
Keywords: carbon dioxide emissions, political-economy, treadmill of 
 production, unions
o
In light of the severe consequences that anthropogenic climate change 
is likely to have on societies and ecosystems (IPCC 2014), and the 
fact that carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are the largest contributor 
to climate change, research on the social forces that influence CO2 
emissions, most of which stem from fossil fuel combustion, is essential. 
Previous cross-national research on structural drivers has demonstrated 
links between CO2 emissions and demographic and political-economic 
factors such as the scale of economic activity as measured by gross 
domestic product (GDP), population, industrialization, urbanization, 
and world-system position (see, e.g., Ergas and York 2012; Greiner and 
McGee 2018; Jorgenson and Clark 2012; Jorgenson et al. 2010; Rosa et 
al. 2004, 2015; York 2008; York et al. 2003a, 2003b). However, a gap in 
this research is a quantitative assessment of how the structure of labor 
relations—an important aspect of industrial and agricultural production 
processes—is connected with CO2 emissions.
The treadmill of production (ToP) (Gould et al. 2008; Schnaiberg 
1980), one of the predominant theories aiming to explain the forces 
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behind environmental problems, argues that capital, state, and labor 
work together toward economic growth, which serves to expand 
resource consumption and waste production, thereby exacerbating 
environmental problems. The treadmill metaphor refers to the processes 
set in motion by corporate efforts to expand profits via technological 
development and increased production and consumption. These pro-
cesses lead to unemployment, due to mechanization, and environmen-
tal degradation stemming from growth in industrial activities. The loss 
of jobs and pollution necessitate further expansion of production to pro-
vide new jobs and fund environmental cleanup and protection efforts. 
Thus, societies are on a “treadmill,” where they must keep running to 
stay in place—that is, the economy must continually grow to maintain 
jobs and address the problems, social and environmental, created by 
growth in the first place.
Some scholars have developed a nuanced approach to understand-
ing the ToP that suggests that, although organized labor sometimes 
serves to accelerate the treadmill, it also can decelerate the treadmill 
as labor unions (hereinafter unions) work to improve workers’ health 
and quality of life (Obach 2002, 2004a, 2004b). Yet, to our knowl-
edge, only one study has assessed the influence of unions, along with 
other structural variables, on CO2 emissions at the cross-national level: 
Timmons Roberts and colleagues (2003) found unionization rates to 
be negatively correlated with CO2 emission intensity in nations, but 
they rely on cross-sectional data. Other studies have examined unions 
and environmentalism through interviews and historical documents but 
do not systematically assess large-scale patterns in the environmental 
consequences of unions (see Dewey 1998; Dreiling 1998; Kojola 2017; 
Mayer 2009; Obach 2002, 2004a). Therefore, it is worthwhile to assess 
whether unionization has measurable consequences on CO2 emissions 
at the national level.
Unions can influence anthropogenic CO2 emissions in various 
ways. They are a place for political advocacy and can play an import-
ant role in economic and management decisions through collective 
bargaining, thereby redistributing capital and resources to limit capital 
accumulation and promote generalized social benefits, including envi-
ronmental protection (Obach 2002, 2004a, 2004b). However, more 
research is needed to assess whether unions have broad structural 
effects on environmental outcomes. This article fills this gap by theo-
rizing how labor may affect environmentally important actions and by 
providing an empirical assessment of whether unionization rates are 
connected with environmental problems. Specifically, we use multilevel 
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analysis of 34 OECD countries from 1970 to 2014 to assess whether the 
percentage of workers who belong to unions in nations is associated 
with CO2 emissions per capita.
Literature Review
The ToP is one of the most influential theoretical frameworks in envi-
ronmental sociology, and focuses on the role of political-economic 
dynamics in connection with environmental problems. Allan Schnai-
berg (1980) introduced the ToP as a structural analysis of environmen-
tal problems in which he incorporates political-economic theories 
including neo-Marxist monopoly capitalism to explain the rise of 
environmental degradation (Foster and York 2004). Several colleagues 
including Ken Gould, Adam Weinberg, and David Pellow worked 
with Schnaiberg to revisit the ToP over the years (Gould et al. 2004, 
2008; Pellow et al. 2000; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994; Schnaiberg et 
al. 2002). The ToP is based on the recognition that economic growth 
requires large amounts of natural resources, produces large quantities 
of waste, and thus causes environmental problems. The nature of the 
capitalist system is centered on production expansion, and profits are 
used for capital growth. To maximize profits, capital tries to suppress 
worker’s rights, environmental protection, and social service programs. 
Schnaiberg (1980) contextualizes the rise of environmental problems 
after World War II, noting that economic changes in most industrial 
nations encourage vast accumulation of capital while extracting natural 
resources and destroying the environment. These capitalist processes 
are being applied at accelerated rates, with technologies needing more 
natural resources and energy consumption. As the name suggests, the 
treadmill illustrates how these economic processes continue on a seem-
ingly endless pursuit.
The ToP has developed over time, reflecting political-economic 
changes of the processes behind environmental degradation. Most nota-
bly, the initial ToP from 1980 did not carefully consider globalization or 
the distinctive dynamics specific to particular localities (Buttle 2004). 
Although the original focus of the ToP was on the United States after 
World War II, the logic of the treadmill can be applied to the dynamics 
of global corporate capitalism. Since 1980, scholars have applied the 
theory to address issues of globalization by incorporating national and 
international divisions of labor, as well as the divide among countries 
in which production and consumption take place. For instance, recent 
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work on the ToP examines how government officials promote neo-
liberal policies of “free trade” that push environmental degradation from 
rich nations to poor nations (Gould et al. 2008). Andrew Jorgenson 
and Brett Clark (2009) argue that the ToP in conjunction with the eco-
logically unequal exchange theory help explain how the structure of 
international trade works to benefit wealthy nations and destroy the 
environments of poor nations. There is still room for theoretical expan-
sions of the ToP to incorporate global capitalist dynamics of foreign 
investments and transnational trade (Jorgenson and Clark 2012).
There are various components to the ToP, but most relevant here is 
the theorization of the alliance among the three key institutional actors 
driving the treadmill: the state, capital, and big labor. The alliance is also 
referred to as the growth coalition, where the state, capital, and labor 
are working to accelerate the treadmill, since these actors each benefit 
from economic growth but do not have the same power, motivations, 
or general interests. Schnaiberg (1980) identifies the state, capital, and 
labor as institutional actors that have cooperative and competitive rela-
tionships toward production expansion. Capital plays the central role 
in production expansion and environmental harm. Even though capital 
relies on the state and labor to maintain the ToP, it undermines the 
credibility of the state and labor when the treadmill system leads to 
unemployment and pollution. For instance, the state has a cooperative 
relationship with capital by supporting treadmill expansion through pol-
icies that encourage economic growth, such as business-friendly tax 
legislation and deregulation (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). However, 
the state is left in a difficult position when government officials are 
held responsible because of public dissatisfaction about the undesirable 
results of the treadmill. Schnaiberg and Gould (1994) argue that the 
state, because it functions more as a force for the elite class, typically 
will not oppose capital. Environmental sociologists argue that legisla-
tion aimed at protecting the environment has had only very modest 
effects on reducing environmental impacts in the production process, 
in part because the state typically does not challenge corporate power 
(Foster et al. 2010). Recycling is an example of the inadequacy of state- 
supported environmental protections in the treadmill system: its expan-
sion in the United States and other nations did little to conserve energy 
and resources and did not provide high-paying jobs (Pellow et al. 2000).
Big labor is theorized to play an important role in the treadmill. 
Schnaiberg (1980) saw more potential for unions compared to the state 
when it comes to defying capital. Capital has a direct relationship with 
labor to produce commodities through labor power and technologies. 
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Furthermore, capital seeks to maximize profits and worker productiv-
ity by lowering wages and increasing technological use. In contrast, 
labor seeks to increase workers’ wages and employment. These labor 
demands put limits on capital, opening up the potential for labor to 
counter the exploitative tendencies of corporations. Although a goal 
of unions is to increase laborers’ income, potentially making them 
supporters of the treadmill, unions also advocate for better working 
conditions (e.g., less exposure to environmental hazards), which require 
employers to address the inherent social cost of maximizing profits. The 
rise of global capitalism pushes governments and global organizations 
to support a structure of international trade in which capital displaces 
union jobs in rich nations to nonunion jobs in poor nations. Indeed, 
the number of unions has been declining since the 1970s because 
of globalized labor markets, international trade, and anti-union laws 
(Blanchflower 2007). In general, the state assists capital’s interests in 
these actions by dismantling regulations and protections for worker 
interests (Oliver 2005). The treadmill system develops new technologies 
to expand production and reduce the power of labor by de-skilling jobs 
and replacing workers with machines. Thus, unions’ ability to advocate 
for higher wages and better working conditions has declined drastically 
over time, shifting their role within the ToP (Buttel 2004; Gould et al. 
2008; Schnaiberg et al. 2002).
Despite their decline in power, unions remain involved in workplace 
decisions, which can lead them to be critical actors on the production 
process and subsequently on the environment. Unions and environ-
mentalists engage in similar economic battles against big, centralized 
capital interests. In fact, unions may serve to challenge the ideological 
forces that perpetuate the treadmill (Gunderson 2017). In the initial ToP, 
organized labor and capital are identified as having a competitive rela-
tionship for the distribution of resources. As Obach (2004b) explains, 
unions can decelerate the treadmill by voicing concerns about environ-
mental quality through collective bargaining actions and by redirecting 
resources into social and employee needs (e.g., social programs, wages, 
public services, health care services) instead of industrial expansion. 
Without these oversights, capital’s elite class is more likely to engage in 
environmental and social exploitation.
The history of unions and environmentalism demonstrates the strat-
egies that unions can deploy to resist capital’s drive for endless growth. 
Obach (2004b) extends the ToP by showing that unions sometimes use 
several mechanisms to slow the treadmill of production. First, unions 
can encourage different types of labor practices. Unions often oppose 
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corporations’ pushes for automation. For instance, during the 1950s and 
1960s, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations (AFL-CIO) voiced concerns over the replacement of workers 
through technology by passing resolutions against automation. Further-
more, the AFL-CIO pursued efforts to compensate workers who lost 
their jobs to technology. Second, unions can advocate for re distributing 
resources to social programs. Unions slow the treadmill by struggling 
to ensure that a share of profits go to workers’ benefits such as health 
insurance and higher wages (Obach 2004b). The treadmill slows down 
if surplus resources are placed toward social needs instead of profit 
expansion (Schnaiberg 1980).
Third, unions can emphasize other factors instead of solely profit. 
Unions can slow the treadmill by advocating for resources to be put 
toward improving working conditions. Organized labor has been 
influential on health and safety concerns, advocating for members’ 
environmental safety in the workplace (Silverman 2006). Unions have 
pushed for environmental reform by raising awareness of pollution in 
the workplace. In the United States, for example, the United Steel-
workers conducted its own safety investigations on smog’s impact on 
workers (Dewey 1998), and the United Farm Workers of America, led 
by Cesar Chavez at the time, followed Rachel Carson’s work to expose 
agricultural pesticides’ harm to workers and consumers. Subsequently, 
growth in public attention around occupational safety was followed 
by rising concerns on community safety from pollution. Unions out-
side the United States have advocated for the environment through the 
workplace and beyond. For example, the Spanish Comisiones Obreras 
is actively involved in occupational health and safety concerns at the 
international level (Stevis 2011). In Italy, unions fought against environ-
mental industrial hazards and helped create the country’s public health 
system and labor statute (Barca 2012).
Although work for environmental justice and protection for work-
ers, such as occupational and community safety, does not directly 
reduce CO2 emissions, a large part of pollution that harms workers 
derives from the use of fossil fuels. Thus, unions collectively working to 
reduce pollution exposure tend to pressure industries to decrease their 
use of fossil fuels, which in turn may help suppress the growth rate of 
CO2 emissions. Furthermore, Roberts and colleagues (2003) argue that 
(globally) the least efficient producers tend to be the most politically 
oppressive and that unions are the key to carbon efficiency.
 Finally, unions have a history of supporting environmental steward-
ship. Labor activists and scholars have shown that, despite potential 
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tensions, there are many instances of union collaborations with envi-
ronmentalists and that unions are a place for environmental advocacy 
(Dewey 1998; Mayer 2009). In the 1970s, the Australian Builders 
Labourers Federation was a key supporter of protecting the environment 
from unsustainable practices by withholding their labor in the “green 
bans” (Snell and Fairbrother 2010). Furthermore, the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions decided to include the “environment” 
within its Working Party on Health, Safety, and Environment (Silverman 
2006). Unions from around the world have gathered to discuss the envi-
ronment and expand workers’ rights to include environmental rights 
(Rathzel and Uzzell 2011). Based on the ToP and on Obach’s (2004b) 
understanding of labor’s role in the treadmill, there are good reasons 
to expect unions to play a critical role in environmental politics. Cen-
tral traits of unions, including the fundamental concern for organizing 
solidarity for better working conditions, links workers collectively with 
environmental issues.
Despite the potential for labor-environment coalitions, there are 
instances around the world in which unions have worked against envi-
ronmental protection. Unions, seeking to protect jobs and wages, have 
often helped spur the treadmill by supporting economic initiatives 
pushed by corporations. Studies find that workers, since they depend 
on their employers for jobs, can be blackmailed into supporting cap-
ital interests in industry (i.e., workers are under pressure to prioritize 
their individual interests over the collective union’s interests), which 
potentially sets up an antagonistic relationship between labor and 
environmental groups (Kazis and Grossman 1982). Specific industrial 
sectors such as road construction and resource extraction often take 
the position that “environmentalism kills jobs” or support weak eco-
logical modernization efforts, which is often in conflict with other union 
organizations that support environmental protection and blue-green 
coalition building (Estabrook 2007; Felli 2014; Rathzel and Uzzell 2011). 
This can encourage public leaders and the media to use “jobs versus the 
environment” rhetoric, even though research shows that environmental 
protection does not typically contribute significantly to job losses (Bell 
and York 2010; Freudenburg et al. 1998; Matthews 2011; Kojola 2017).
An example of the antagonism between workers and environ-
mentalists is the battle over protection for the northern spotted owl 
in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. Timber firms worked to 
subvert and undermine environmental protections to allow for con-
tinued clear-cutting of ancient forests (the owl’s habitat) by claiming 
economic necessity (Foster 1993). Here, the timber industry framed the 
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issue as one in which environmentalists were trying to push laws that 
would lead to job losses, thus setting up the idea that the conflict was 
between workers and environmentalism (Freudenburg et al. 1998). Herb 
 Thompson and Julie Tracy (1995) demonstrate a similar divide between 
environmental conservationists and timber workers in Western Austra-
lia. Similarly, some unions in Spain support mountaintop removal in the 
Laciana Valley, arguing it will bring more jobs (Cabrejas 2012). A more 
recent example of the battle between workers and environmentalists is 
the ongoing debate over the Keystone XL pipeline in North America, 
where some unions supported the construction for jobs and economic 
growth and withdrew their support for the BlueGreen Alliance (Kojola 
2017). Nontheless, recent research found that US union households 
had equal strength of environmental concerns as nonunion households, 
even in weak economic periods, demonstrating that union members do 
not necessarily see a tension between supporting workers’ interests as 
well as environmental protection (Kojola et al. 2014).
It is important to recognize that the effects of unions are mediated 
by their connections with various aspects of working conditions. Some 
scholars have examined the connection between working hours in the 
typical week, and CO2 emissions (Knight et al. 2013) and energy con-
sumption (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015) at the cross-national 
level, finding that more hours is connected with higher emissions and 
consumption. Additionally, Jared Fitzgerald, Juliet Schor, and Andrew 
Jorgenson (2018) found a similar connection between working hours 
and emissions across the United States. Since unions can affect working 
hours, these findings may be connected with unionization. This body 
of research suggests it is important to control for various aspects of 
working conditions when assessing the effects of unionization.
Clearly, more research is needed to assess the general connection 
between unions and the environment—especially at the global level, 
because most studies focus locally (Silverman 2006). At the state level 
in the United States, Thomas Dietz and colleagues (2014) found that 
unionization did not affect CO2 emissions when controlling for popula-
tion, affluence, and degree of support for environmentalism. However, 
as noted earlier, the issue lacks cross-national research. Based on the 
ToP, we argue that the unionization of workers is a gauge to evaluate the 
strength of labor. In the above-reviewed literature, we identify several 
key reasons to expect CO2 emissions to be lower in nations where labor 
is more powerful than in nations with disempowered labor: (1) unions 
often resist mechanization in the production process, and mechaniza-
tion is energy (and therefore CO2) intensive; (2) unions work to protect 
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workers’ health from exposure to pollution, which may lead them to 
support regulations on fossil fuel, chemical, and other energy-intensive 
sectors; and (3) more broadly, unions have the potential to resist the 
power of corporate actors that drive the treadmill to endlessly expand 
production and consumption despite social and environmental harm. 
None of these are singular mechanisms; rather, they are tendencies that 
may structurally affect national fossil fuel consumption and, therefore, 
CO2 emissions.
Here, we employ union membership as an indicator of union 
strength to evaluate the influence of unionization on CO2 emissions 
per capita. Our union density measurement is commonly employed by 
other researchers (Sano and Williamson 2008). It does not include those 
individuals who are not working or actively looking for work, such as 
prisoners and students. Scholars have used similar data to those we 
use to investigate the connections between union density and various 
social, economic, and institutional factors (Checchi and Visser 2005; 
Sano and Williamson 2008; Scruggs and Lange 2002).
Hypotheses
Based on the discussion so far, we hypothesize two alternative out-
comes regarding the relationship between union density and CO2 emis-
sions. Each hypothesis is based on the following question: Is a nation’s 
union density associated with CO2 emissions per capita?
H1: Nations with higher levels of unionized labor have lower levels 
of CO2 emissions per capita.
H2: Nations with higher levels of unionized labor have higher levels 
of CO2 emissions per capita.
H1 is derived from Obach’s (2004b) extension of the ToP and assumes 
that nations with highly unionized workforces will experience greater 
opposition to the treadmill, which will suppress CO2 emissions by 
reducing the reallocation of profits into fossil-fuel-intensive processes. 
Inversely, H2 is based on the implication in the original ToP formulation 
(Schnaiberg 1980) that unions operate as a facet of the treadmill, and 
nations with high union density will therefore have relatively high CO2 
emissions because big labor helps drive continual intensification of pro-
duction. Note that each hypothesis is about the general environmental 
implications of the workforce unionization across nations and does not 
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address the specifics of union participation in each nation. Furthermore, 
union strategies are not monolithic and are often adversarial to one 
another. Also, we are assessing not whether unions take specific actions 
that affect CO2 emissions but rather whether the degree of unioniza-
tion in nations is connected with emissions through multiple potential 
routes. Union density may be interpreted as a general indicator of the 
relative strength of labor; thus, any estimated effects from unionization 
may not be directly traceable to specific acts of unions themselves but 
may rather reflect how the power of labor affects production processes 
more generally. Therefore, we are cautious with our interpretations, 
since both hypotheses are about the average consequences of union-
ization in nations.
Additionally, since we are not, of course, using experimental data, 
we cannot establish causality with high confidence (this is a limitation 
of nearly all sociological research, since sociologists rarely work with 
experimental data). Rather, our models assess whether the associations 
that are expected from the processes proposed by theory exist in the 
data. Therefore, in the interpretation of our results, the terminology 
of cause and effect does not mean that statistical analyses alone are 
sufficient to establish such relationships but rather means that the asso-
ciations that we find fit with theorized causal processes. The theorized 
processes discussed earlier are not mechanistic but rather structural and 
diffuse (i.e., unionization may promote or suppress processes leading 
to CO2 emissions through a variety of routes). Thus, theory suggests 
that unionization creates a context that shapes processes that influence 
CO2 emissions. In this, the connection between unionization and CO2 
emissions is theorized to be more of a formal (structural) cause than an 
efficient one, although unions may in some instances specifically push 
for environmental reforms and thereby have a direct, efficient influence.
Data and Methods
We use multilevel regression models to assess the association between 
union membership rates and growth in CO2 emissions per capita using 
cross-national, time-series data spanning from 1970 to 2014 for the 34 
nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD).1 We focus on OECD nations because they have consis-
tent and reliable data on union membership, which is not the case for 
most other nations. Because we focus on OECD nations, we are only 
assessing the effects of union membership in relatively affluent, indus-
27
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trialized economies. We chose 1970 to 2014 to allow for the widest 
number of observations, but some models cover only 1991 to 2014, 
since some of our independent variables were not recorded before this 
time. We end our time frame in 2014 because that is the most recent 
year for which data are available for the dependent variable, CO2 emis-
sions per capita. All data are from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators (WBG 2018), with the exception of the data on union 
membership and working hours, which were obtained from the OECD 
(2018). We include as control variables the factors that other studies 
have shown to be most consistently connected with CO2 emissions 
(e.g., Ergas and York 2012; Jorgenson et al. 2010; Joregonson and Clark 
2012; Knight et al. 2013; York 2008; York et al. 2003a, 2003b). We also 
include variables that characterize the workforce, since these may be 
connected with unionization. Summary statistics for all variables are 
presented in Table 1.
We proceed with multilevel modeling because, first, the data 
have a hierarchical format with yearly estimates (level 1) nested within 
countries (level 2). We expect there to be significant differences among 
countries, and the multilevel format can examine this variation. Second, 
multilevel modeling is more flexible with unbalanced panel data (Hox 
2010; Singer and Willett 2003). We chose to proceed with a two-level 
random intercept model. We estimate the model (in which t represents 
year and i represents country) as follows:
Micro:
CO2pcti = β0ix0ti + β1unionti + β2GDPpcti + β3GDPpc2ti  
+ β4age_depti + β5urbanti + … + βkyear2014ti + e0ti
Macro:
β0i = β0 + μ0i
Combined model:
CO2pcti = β0 + β1unionti + β2GDPpcti + β3GDPpc2ti  
+ β4age_depti + β5urbanti + … + βkyear2014ti + e0ti + μ0i
Level 2: [μ0i]~N(0,σ2u0)
Level 1: [e0ti]~N(0,σ2e0)
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Dependent Variable
CO2 emissions per capita: emissions stemming from the combustion of 
fossil fuels (including solid, liquid, and gas fuels, as well as gas flaring) 
and the production of cement (in metric tons per capita).
Independent Variables
Unionization: the percentage of the workforce that is unionized. This is 
our main variable of interest. The OECD provided union density mea-
surements from two sources: administrative and survey. The availability 
of the measurements varied between countries. For example, the United 
States offered only survey data while Spain offered administrative and 
survey. In nations that have both, the correlation between administrative 
and survey data is very high (over 0.99). To maximize the coverage of 
the union density variable, we took the average of the administrative 
and survey measurements if both were available. If only one measure 
was available, we took the available measurement.
Table 1 n Descriptive Statistics of All Variables
mean sd min max n
CO2 emission per capita 9.500 4.832 1.223 40.590 1148
Union density 37.718 21.532 5.291 92.468 1148
GDP per capita $32,318.53 $17,266.45 1,815.02 108,577.40 1148
Age dependency ratio 51.936 7.170 36.323 100.819 1148
Urbanization (%) 75.244 11.339 38.234 97.818 1148
Working hours 1757.1 202.2 1362.1 2422.0 916
Unemployment (%) 7.65 3.99 1.78 27.47 701
Industrialization (%) 26.678 5.824 10.983 43.543 701
Part-time (%) 24.88 8.99 4.96 46.21 627
Wage and salaried 
workers (%)
82.339 8.253 45.206 93.471 701
29
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GDP per capita (in thousands, constant 2010 US$): the connec-
tion between economic growth and CO2 emissions is well established. 
We include a quadratic (squared) version of GDP per capita to assess 
whether there is a nonlinear relationship between economic growth 
and emissions.
Urbanization: the percentage of population living in urban areas. 
Urbanization is an indicator of modernization and development and 
has been linked to CO2 emissions in several studies.
Age dependency ratio: the ratio of people under 15 and over 64 
of age to those aged 15 to 64. Since age structure is connected with 
workforce participation, this is an important control variable.
Unemployment: the percentage of the workforce that is unem-
ployed. The level of unemployment is likely to affect both the power of 
labor and the level of production, so it is necessary to incorporate the 
unemployment rate in our models.
Employed in industry: the percentage of the workforce employed 
in the industrial sector. Since unionization is typically highest in the 
industrial sector, it is necessary to control for the share of the workforce 
in this sector.
Working hours: the average annual working hours for the work-
force. Previous research (Knight et al. 2013) demonstrates that higher 
working hours is connected with higher emissions. Hours calculated 
include all types of workers including full-time, part-time, part-year, 
and overtime.
Part-time workers: the percentage of workers working less than 30 
per week. We include part-time workers as a labor condition control, 
because part-time work captures nonstandard employment. Part-time 
work does not include the benefits and stability of full-time employ-
ment. This variable was provided from the World Bank and is estimated 
by the International Labor Organization.
Wage and salaried workers: the percentage of workers with “paid 
employment jobs” with explicit or implicit employment contracts. Wage 
and salaried workers captures the type of economy. A high propor-
tion of wage and salaried workers indicates a formal economy, while a 
lower number indicates an informal economy. This variable was pro-
vided from the World Bank and is estimated by the International Labor 
Organization.
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Variable
Model 1 
(1970–2014)
Model 2 
(1970–2014)
Model 3 
(1991–2014)
Model 4 
(1991–2014)
Time (level 1) variables
Union density (%)
—
−.028 (.007)*** −.046 (.012)*** −.033 (.012)**
GDP per capita  
(in thousands, 
constant 2010 US$)
.207 (.026)*** −.016 (.035) .017 (.031)
(GDP per capita)2 −.002 (.000)*** .001 (.000)** .000 (.000)
Age dependency −.072 (.011)*** −.084 (.022)*** −.028 (.020)
Urbanization (%) .129 (.014)*** .099 (.022)*** .082 (.023)***
Working hours
—
−.002 (.001)
—
Unemployment (%) −.033 (.019)
Industrial work (%) .184 (.031)*** .261 (.027)***
Part-time (%) .053 (.015)*** .054 (.014)***
Wage and salaried 
workers (%) .119 (.022)*** .079 (.022)***
Year dummies
1971
—
−.257 (.434)
— —
1972 −.053 (.441)
1973 .273 (.443)
1974 −.180 (.444)
1975 −.797 (.434)
1976 −.665 (.446)
1977 −1.008 (.438)*
1978 −.680 (.436)
1979 −.532 (.444)
1980 1.101 (.434)*
1981 −1.774 (.443)***
1982 −2.016 (.455)***
1983 2.486 (.448)***
1984 −2.370 (.453)***
1985 −2.393 (.458)***
1986 −2.469 (.462)***
1987 −2.768 (.462)***
1988 −2.575 (.473)***
1989 −2.346 (.475)***
1990 −2.712 (.477)***
1991 −2.611 (.481)***
Table 2 n Multilevel Regression Results of Factors Influencing CO2 
Emissions per Capita.
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Variable
Model 1 
(1970–2014)
Model 2 
(1970–2014)
Model 3 
(1991–2014)
Model 4 
(1991–2014)
Year dummies (cont.)
1992
—
−2.753 (.478)*** −.156 (.309) −.156 (.305)
1993 −2.698 (.480)*** −.004 (.318) .491 (.308)
1994 −2.560 (.483)*** .124 (.322) .156 (.316)
1995 −2.591 (.480)*** −.018 (.293) .061 (.293)
1996 −2.316 (.491)*** .415 (.295) .538 (.294)
1997 −2.864 (.502)*** .195 (.298) .308 (.293)
1998 −3.048 (.500)*** −.002 (.297) .079 (.296)
1999 −2.847 (.523)*** −.133 (.315) .154 (.313)
2000 −2.960 (.527)*** −.550 (.325) −.108 (.322)
2001 −2.948 (.528)*** −.444 (.332) .086 (.327)
2002 −3.054 (.536)*** −.493 (.343) .135 (.334)
2003 −3.029 (.539)*** −.190 (349) .414 (.342)
2004 −3.001 (.552)*** −.384 (.361) .299 (.352)
2005 −3.254 (.559)*** −.725 (.373) .009 (.364)
2006 −3.216 (.567)*** −.666 (.388) .127 (.376)
2007 −3.389 (.581)*** −1.054 (.403)** −.169 (.389)
2008 −3.611 (.576)*** −1.137 (.406)** −.264 (.390)
2009 −4.215 (.570)*** −1.538 (.406)*** −.587 (.393)
2010 −3.928 (.575)*** −1.022 (.417)* −.084 (.404)
2011 −4.314 (.578)*** −1.464 (.423)** −.519 (.411)
2012 −4.539 (.582)*** −1.705 (.431)*** −.734 (.418)
2013 −4.620 (.582)*** −1.696 (.436)*** −.727 (.425)
2014 −4.946 (.590)*** −2.115 (.449)*** −1.084 (.436)*
Constant 9.141 (.829)*** 3.612 (1.554)* −4.097 (3.982)
−9.900 
(3.011)**
Variance terms
σ2e0 3.137 1.885 0.448 0.529
σ2u0 23.248 19.17 11.386 13.657
N (total) 1148 1148 519 555
Number of 
countries 34 34 33 34
* p < .05 | ** p < .01 | *** p < .001
Note: For Model 2, the reference category for the year dummies is 1970.  
For Models 3 and 4, it is 1991.
Table 2 n Continued.
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Results
The logic of multilevel modeling is to fit a variety of models, begin-
ning with the unconditional means. Our goal is to assess the extent to 
which unionization is correlated with emissions independent of tradi-
tional drivers of emissions and other indicators of workforce participa-
tion. Results from the multilevel analyses are presented in Table 2. The 
null model (Model 1) has a fixed effect (referred to as the constant/
intercept) of 9.141, indicating the overall average of CO2 emissions per 
capita across all countries and observations. The null model, and all 
subsequent models, have two random effects: first, the within- country 
variance (σ2e0) is 3.167, and second, the between-country variance 
(σ2u0) is 23.248. We calculated the intraclass correlation coefficient to 
estimate the amount of variance explained at level 2 (i.e., the country 
level). For the null model, the intraclass correlation coefficient is about 
88.11 percent.
We added predictors based on our theory-driven hypotheses to 
Model 2, which includes unionization and other important control 
variables indicated from previous research, including GDP per capita, 
age dependency ratio, and urbanization. For Model 2, to maximize the 
number of observations included in the models, we used only con-
trols that have good data coverage. Thus, Model 2 includes data from 
1970 to 2014. Model 2 has a fixed intercept of 3.612 and includes year 
dummies to control for period effects. The effect of union density is 
negative and statistically significant, demonstrating that an increase in 
union density is associated with a decrease of CO2 emissions per capita 
while controlling for other variables. Model 2 further demonstrates that 
an increase in age dependency ratio (e.g., working-age population) is 
associated with a decrease in CO2 emissions per capita. The results also 
show that an increase in urbanization corresponds with an increase 
in CO2 emissions per capita. Finally, GDP per capita has a quadratic 
relationship. Results from the likelihood ratio test showed that Model 2 
is superior to the null model.
To further assess the effects of unionization, we include additional 
labor controls of working hours, part-time workers, wage and salaried 
workers, unemployment, and industrialization in Model 3. Average 
annual working hours gauges that of a nation’s workforce and includes 
all types of workers. To control for the stratification among type of 
work, we include the percentage of part-time workers and of wage 
and salaried workers. For example, US annual working hours is higher 
than average. However, the United States also has a high number of 
33
IS laBOr GreeN? o
involuntary part-time workers who would prefer to work more hours 
(Lambert et al. 2012). Model 3 includes percentage of unemployment 
and workers in the industrial sector.
Model 3 includes roughly half the observations from the previous 
models, covering only 1991 to 2014, due to missing data on the addi-
tional control variables. The number of countries represented declined 
to 33, because Iceland does not provide data on annual working hours. 
In Model 3,2 unions, age dependency ratio, and urbanization all main-
tain their direction and significance. Only the quadratic term for GDP 
per capita is significant. Among the labor control variables, Model 3 
indicate that increases in the percentage of workers in industrial jobs is 
associated with an increase in CO2 emissions per capita. Furthermore, 
Model 3 demonstrates that increases in part-time and wage and salaried 
workers corresponds with an increase in CO2 emissions per capita. 
Working hours and unemployment did not have significant effects.
Finally, Model 4 includes only variables that had significant effects 
in Model 2 or Model 3. All variables except GDP per capita and age 
dependency ratio remain significant. Model 2 is a parsimonious model 
with the widest coverage. Model 4 is perhaps the most important 
model, since it controls for a wide range of factors yet still has reason-
able coverage. Model 3 has low coverage compared to Model 1 and 
Model 4, but it has the most extensive controls. Nonetheless, all the 
models indicate that unionization has a significant, negative effect on 
emissions that is independent of other drivers of emissions and other 
indicators of workforce participation. These findings provide clear sup-
port for the hypothesis that nations with more highly unionized work-
forces have lower CO2 emissions per capita than nations with a lower 
proportion of unionized employees (H1), and contradicts the hypothesis 
that unionization contributes to higher emissions (H2).
Discussion and Conclusion
Previous research demonstrates moments of antagonism between 
unions and environmentalists (Foster 1993; Kojola 2017). Despite these 
tensions, unions have played an important role in environmental activ-
ism (Dewey 1998; Mayer 2009). Workplaces are where many economic 
and environmental decisions take place, and unions are institutions that 
affect environmental conditions. Here, we empirically assessed the 
connection between the degree of unionization in OECD nations and 
CO2 emissions in those nations. Our analysis shows that nations with 
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highly unionized workforces have lower CO2 emissions than nations 
with less unionized workforces, controlling for several factors. This find-
ing demonstrates that unions are an important part of understanding 
anthropogenic drivers of CO2 emissions, and suggests that unions may 
have environmentally beneficial effects on production processes. Our 
analysis demonstrates that global efforts for workers’ rights may help 
efforts to reduce CO2 emissions and to mitigate climate change.
The treadmill of production theory as further refined by Obach 
(2004b) provides a framework for explaining why unions mitigate 
environ mental impacts. Unions and environmentalist organizations 
have a common struggle in fighting the excesses of the global capitalist 
system. There are a variety of ways in which unions can act as propel-
lers of changes in environmental practices through political advocacy 
and collective bargaining agreements. Unions are organizations that 
provide a space for discussions of social and environmental issues. 
The treadmill slows down if surplus resources are placed toward social 
needs instead of profit expansion (Schnaiberg 1980), and unions appear 
to encourage a focus on social benefits. If profits are directed toward 
the general social good, then there is less opportunity for the elites to 
reinvest surplus into practices harmful to the environment.
Future research should investigate the nuances of unions and envi-
ronmental impacts such as the mechanisms within workplace arenas 
and collective bargaining processes in which workers make decisions 
that influence the environment. Furthermore, future research should 
explore case studies in specific nations of the local dynamics among 
unions and environmental impacts. Our analysis suggests that the 
strength of labor unions may help mitigate environmental problems 
by encouraging environmental stewardship, redistributing resources to 
social programs, and emphasizing factors other than corporate profits.
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Notes
1. Latvia joined the OECD in 2016, bringing it to 35 members. We examine the 
34 nations that were members as of 2014: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
2. An alternative modeling approach is to focus on total rather than per capita 
emissions. In models not presented here, we estimated STIRPAT (Stochastic Impacts by 
Regression on Population, Affluence, and Technology) versions of our models, where 
population was included as an independent variable, total emissions was used as the 
dependent variable, and all variables were logged (York et al. 2003a, 2003b). These 
models suggest findings similar to those we present here. For example, in the STIRPAT 
version of Model 3, unionization has a significant (at the 0.001 level) negative effect 
on emissions, and population has a coefficient of almost exactly 1.0, indicating that it 
proportionately scales emissions (which supports the implicit assumption behind using 
per capita values).
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